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Abstract
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual
investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully in-
formed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imper-
fect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast
to previous studies, which focus on perfect investigations. The contrast
exists because if precontractual investigation is perfect, the benefits of
sequential screening vanish.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes profit-maximizing contracts in a principal-agent model of
bilateral trade with the following information structure: Initially, both parties
do not know the agent’s preferences over trade agreements. While deliberat-
ing whether to accept a contract, the agent can spend resources to investigate
the state. In any case, he perfectly learns his preferences at some date when
the contract has been signed, but not yet carried out. The principal, on the
other hand, can neither observe whether the agent conducts a precontractual
investigation, nor verify any reports that the agent might submit about his
private information. A good example for a trade relationship with this infor-
mation structure is procurement of goods that need to be customized. Here,
the contractor typically does not know his operating costs before inspecting the
designs, but can make a forecast based on experience from related projects.
Should the principal encourage the agent to conduct a precontractual inves-
tigation? In a seminal paper, Crémer and Khalil (1992) address this question
under the assumption that the agent would obtain through an investigation the
very same, perfect information about his preferences which he otherwise receives
at no cost after the signing of the contract. They find that the principal is un-
ambiguously better off if the agent has no incentive to acquire precontractual
information. The result does not hold if multiple agents compete for a single,
bilateral contract; the principal might then encourage information gathering
to find a suitable candidate (Compte and Jehiel 2008, see also Craswell 1988).
Apart from this qualification, Crémer and Khalil’s finding suggests the follow-
ing conclusion: an agent should not be encouraged to investigate his preferences
before entering into a contract if he will learn them anyway afterwards, before
the transaction takes place. If true, this conclusion would be astonishing. It
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implies, for instance, that a customer should not be encouraged to examine test
reviews before buying a returnable good—which seems to be at odds with the
prevalence of test reviews and generous return rights. The purpose of this paper
is to show that the conclusion is false. According to my analysis, the princi-
pal induces information gathering if and only if she benefits from sequential
screening.
I address the question of whether the principal should encourage the agent
to conduct a precontractual investigation under the assumption that an inves-
tigation does not remove all uncertainty about the agent’s preferences. Either
way, the terms of trade optimally depend on communication, because the agent
obtains private information during the interaction. By the revelation principle
for multistage games (Myerson 1986), the principal can without loss of gen-
erality design the contract so that the agent is willing to report each piece of
private information truthfully as soon as he obtains it. Thus, in particular,
contracts that deter the agent from conducting an investigation have a static
screening mechanism, and contracts that induce him to do so have a sequential
screening mechanism. Now, sequential screening is advantageous, because it
forces the agent to make a decision about deviations from truthful reporting
when the exact gains thereof are still uncertain—unless precontractual inves-
tigation removes all uncertainty about the agent’s preferences, as Crémer and
Khalil (1992) assume. I show that if the agent’s investigation costs are low,
optimal contracts induce information gathering.
The paper is related to the growing literature that explores scope and design
of dynamic screening mechanisms in scenarios where agents gradually receive
private information over time (e.g., Battaglini 2005; Boleslavsky and Said 2013;
Courty and Li 2000; Esö and Szentes 2007; Krähmer and Strausz 2011; Pavan
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et al. 2013). That literature usually imposes stringent regularity conditions
which allow to fully characterize optimal contracts.1 To maintain generality, I
do not follow this approach. My analysis only verifies the key property: optimal
contracts might involve a sequential screening mechanism, rather than a static
one. Most closely related within the literature is the seminal article on advanced
ticket sales by Courty and Li (2000). In their model, the agent freely obtains
private information about his valuation for a ticket both before and after the
contract has been signed. Conceptually, the present framework adds a moral
hazard issue to that setting, as precontractual investigation entails costs and
cannot be observed. A polar scenario, with postcontractual investigation, has
been analyzed by Krähmer and Strausz (2011). There, the agent’s incentives
to acquire information differ, since he cannot quit the contract afterwards.
Relevant is finally recent work by Krähmer and Strausz (2012). They show
under general conditions that dynamic screening mechanisms cannot improve
over static ones if agents are protected by limited liability. According to my
analysis, the principal will then discourage information gathering.
Various papers analyze profit-maximizing contracts for related scenarios
with endogenous precontractual information.2 The use of sequential screen-
ing mechanisms has not been explored yet. Indeed, Crémer et al. (1998a),
Kessler (1998), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Shi (2012), and Szalay (2009)
consider situations in which agents do not receive additional information once
the contract has been signed. Crémer et al. (1998b), Crémer and Khalil (1994),
Matthews and Persico (2005), and Terstiege (2012), on the other hand, assume
1See Battaglini and Lamba (2012) and Pavan et al. (2013) for details and discussions of
the regularity conditions.
2See Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on
mechanism design with endogenous information.
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like Crémer and Khalil (1992) that precontractual investigation yields perfect
information about the unknown state. One of the literature’s key objectives is
to examine comparative statics with respect to investigation costs and timing.
This paper, in contrast, effectively performs a comparative static analysis with
respect to the quality of precontractual investigation: I show that a principal
might only induce an imperfect investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 derives the main result, according to which optimal contracts might
induce precontractual information acquisition. Section 4 concludes. Proofs
appear in the appendix.
2 Model
I use a variant of the procurement model by Crémer and Khalil (1992). Specif-
ically, a principal seeks to purchase units of some good which an agent can
produce. Given output q ≥ 0, marginal disutility of production β, and transfer
t ∈ R, the agent’s payoff is t− βq. The principal’s payoff is V (q)− t, where V
is strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfies limq→0 V ′(q) = ∞
and limq→∞ V ′(q) = 0.
When the principal offers the contract, neither party knows the value of the
disutility parameter β. Both believe that β equals βi,
i ∈ I , {1, . . . , n},
with respective prior probability γi > 0. Suppose 1 < n <∞, and let 0 < β1 <
· · · < βn < ∞. The agent learns the true value of β before production takes
place, but only after the date at which he must decide about his participation
in the contract.
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At investigation costs e ≥ 0, the agent can acquire information about the
disutility parameter while deliberating whether to accept the contract. Both
parties assume that such precontractual information gives rise to one of the
posterior probability distributions (γji)ni=1 of β,
j ∈ J , {1, . . . ,m},
with respective probability pij > 0. Suppose 1 < m < ∞, and let the possible
posterior distributions be ordered in terms of first-order stochastic dominance:
for any i < n, the cumulative posterior probability that βi obtains,
Γji ,
i∑
k=1
γjk,
strictly decreases in j. By Bayes’ rule, it furthermore holds that the expected
posterior probability
∑m
j=1 pijγji equals the prior probability γi.
I depart from Crémer and Khalil (1992) and assume that precontractual
information does not reveal the value of the disutility parameter perfectly. In
particular, let {i ∈ I : γji > 0} = I for all j, so that the agent still deems
each level of β possible upon acquiring information. Crémer and Khalil, on the
other hand, effectively assume m = n and {i ∈ I : γji > 0} = {j}, so that
information gathering removes all uncertainty.
The principal cannot observe whether the agent acquires precontractual
information. Moreover, she can neither explore the disutility of production
herself, nor verify any reports that the agent might submit. To distinguish the
two possible pieces of private information of the model, I refer to j ∈ J as the
agent’s posterior belief and to i ∈ I as his type. Given i, k ∈ I with i < k,
I say that type i is more efficient (less inefficient) than type k. Similarly,
given j, l ∈ J with j < l, I say that posterior belief j is more optimistic (less
pessimistic) than posterior belief l.
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The timing of the events can be summarized as follows:
1. Principal offers contract
2. Agent can acquire precontractual information to obtain posterior belief
3. Agent accepts or rejects contract
4. If contract accepted: Agent learns type before producing output
If contract rejected: Relationship ends without trade
Efficiency.—From an efficiency perspective, the agent should produce the
quantity q∗ , V ′−1(β). Precontractual information gathering is socially wasteful
given that the agent anyway learns the true value of β—perfectly, at no costs,
and before production takes place.
3 Analysis
I now study the contracting problem from the perspective of the principal, who
wants to maximize her expected payoff. My aim is to examine whether contract
design should provide incentives that induce the agent to acquire information.
It will turn out that if investigation costs are low, the principal must make
a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction, so that contracts which
induce information gathering cannot be ruled out solely on the grounds that
they are inefficient. On the contrary, such contracts possibly admit a more
favorable trade-off.
3.1 Trade-off
The objective of this section is to show that if investigation costs are low, the
principal must make a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction to find
an optimal contract. Since precontractual information gathering is inefficient,
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I focus on contracts which deter the agent from conducting an investigation.
According to the revelation principle for multistage games (Myerson 1986), the
analysis can additionally be restricted to direct, incentive-compatible contracts.
Henceforth, I refer to the direct contracts used to discourage precontrac-
tual information gathering as pooling contracts. A pooling contract, formally
denoted by
CP , (tk, qk)k∈I ,
stipulates the terms of trade as follows. Once the agent learns his type, he is
asked to announce it with a report k ∈ I. Given this report, the parties must
exchange (tk, qk). Pooling contracts are incentive-compatible if the agent finds
it best to conduct no investigation and to report the disutility of production
truthfully.
In detail, a pooling contract should thus satisfy the following conditions.
First, the agent must submit an honest report about his type. Using for the
agent’s payoff the notation
Ui , ti − βiqi,
this condition reads:
Ui ≥ Uk + (βk − βi)qk ∀i, k ∈ I. (P1)
Second, the agent should be willing to join the contract. Since he does not
yet know his type when the participation decision is due, this constraint only
requires that the contract guarantees him a non-negative payoff in expectation,
rather than for each particular type. Importantly, the expectation derives from
the prior belief, because the agent is supposed to dispense with information
gathering:
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi ≥ 0. (P2)
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Finally, the agent must indeed not acquire information before deciding whether
to participate in the contract. Precontractual information is valuable to him
if, with some posterior beliefs, the proposal yields a negative expected payoff.
For if he could update his expectation, he would be able to avoid a likely
loss by refusing to accept the contract offer. The constraint requires that the
agent’s valuation for precontractual information is smaller than the level of
investigation costs:
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi ≥
m∑
j=1
pij max
{
n∑
i=1
γjiUi, 0
}
− e. (P3)
Consider now the principal’s objective. By definition, her expected payoff
from a pooling contract that satisfies the conditions listed above is
∆P ,
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γji[V (qi)− ti].
Thus, the best pooling contracts are the solutions to
PP : max
CP
∆P s.t. (P1)–(P3).
The following lemma suggests a more transparent representation of the best
pooling contracts.
Lemma 1. For each pooling contract that satisfies (P1)–(P3), there is a pooling
contract with identical expected payoffs for both parties that satisfies
Ui − Ui+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (∗)
qi − qi+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (1)
m∑
j=1
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γji(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
≥ 0, (2)
m∑
j=l
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γji(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
+ e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (3)
Moreover, (∗) and (1)–(3) together imply (P1)–(P3).
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Proof. Follows from Claims A1–A3 in the appendix.
According to (∗), the agent earns a rent for not exaggerating the disutility of
production. By (1), on the other hand, reporting a more efficient type obliges
him to produce more output. These two, standard constraints replace (P1) to
make sure that truthful reporting is incentive-compatible.
(2) is the participation constraint, which replaces (P2). Observe that the
agent’s expected payoff equals his payoff with the most inefficient type, Un,
plus the expected rent. Henceforth, I refer to −Un as a participation fee. The
agent finds the contact acceptable if, given the prior belief, the participation
fee does not exceed the expected rent.
(3), finally, guarantees instead of (P3) that the agent does not acquire in-
formation. Precontractual information is valuable to the agent if, with some
posterior belief, the participation fee exceeds the rent which he can expect, so
that his expected payoff given that posterior belief is negative. At this point,
the first-order stochastic dominance ranking of the posterior beliefs becomes
relevant: By (∗), the rent decreases in the type. Consequently, the ranking
implies that an agent with a more optimistic posterior belief expects to earn
more rent, because he is more confident to have a low disutility of production.
The formulation of (3) uses the converse implication that if the participation
fee exceeds the expected rent with some posterior belief j, then so it does for
all posterior beliefs l > j.
Condition (∗) can be inserted directly into the principal’s objective function,
which I now state as the difference between the expected surplus and the agent’s
expected payoff:
∆̂P ,
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γji[V (qi)− βiqi]−
m∑
j=1
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γji(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
.
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Thus, Lemma 1 allows to represent the best pooling contracts as the solutions
to
P̂P : max
(qi)ni=1,−Un
∆̂P s.t. (1)–(3).
The contracting problem involves the following trade-off. To maximize
the expected surplus, the principal should discourage information gathering.
Hence, she should offer a pooling contract, the stipulated output level being
efficient given the prevailing type. To minimize the agent’s expected payoff, on
the other hand, the principal can exploit the agent’s initial ignorance regarding
the disutility of production. Specifically, she should appropriate the expected
rent with a participation fee. In sum, the contract should thus feature:
(qi)
n
i=1 = (q
∗
i )
n
i=1
−Un =
m∑
j=1
pij
n−1∑
i=1
Γji(βi+1 − βi)q∗i+1.
This scheme satisfies the monotonicity constraint, (1), as well as the partici-
pation constraint, (2). But if the agent acquired information and updated to
a pessimistic posterior belief, he would expect to earn less rent than initially
assumed, and hence find the contract unprofitable. Accordingly, precontractual
information is valuable to him. If information gathering entails low costs, con-
dition (3) thus forces the principal to make a trade-off between efficiency and
surplus extraction. Contracts which induce the agent to conduct an investiga-
tion can then not be ruled out solely on the grounds that they are inefficient.
3.2 Benchmark
As a benchmark, it is instructive to review the contracting problem under the
assumption that precontractual information reveals the disutility of production
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perfectly. Given this assumption, my model is equivalent to the one studied by
Crémer and Khalil (1992). Their analysis shows that optimal contracts never
induce information acquisition.
Crémer and Khalil’s (1992) finding can be explained by the following
thought experiment. Consider a contract that induces information acquisition.
Imagine now a different timing, according to which this contract is offered only
after the date at which the agent learns his type for free. Since precontractual
investigation exposes the disutility of production perfectly, the agent has the
same information as under the original timing when making the participation
decision and choosing a reporting strategy. By “reveled preferences”, the con-
tract therefore implements the same terms of trade. But the agent has clearly
no incentive to acquire information in advance.
The thought experiment suggests that for each contract which induces in-
formation acquisition, one can construct a pooling contract that yields both
parties the same payoffs as the original contract. In fact, the principal can
do better and reduce the transfers of the pooling contract, as the agent saves
on investigation costs. I want to find out whether Crémer and Khalil’s (1992)
finding extends to the current model, in which precontractual information is
imperfect.
3.3 Main result
This section presents the main result, according to which optimal contracts
might induce precontractual information acquisition. Again, I apply the reve-
lation principle for multistage games (Myerson 1986) and restrict attention to
direct, incentive-compatible contracts.
I refer to the direct contracts used to encourage information acquisition as
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separating contracts. A separating contract, generally denoted by
CS , ((tlk, qlk)k∈I)l∈J ,
stipulates the terms of trade as follows. First, the agent must submit a report
l ∈ J about his posterior belief, where J ⊂ J denotes the set of posterior
beliefs for which the agent is supposed to join the contract. Importantly, the
revelation principle demands that the report is due before the agent learns his
type. Later on, the agent has to submit a report k ∈ I about the type. Given
some sequence of reports lk, the parties must exchange (tlk, qlk). A separating
contracts is incentive-compatible if the agent prefers to gather information, to
join the contract if and only if j ∈ J , and to submit a sequence of two truthful
reports.
In fact, the analysis may ignore separating contracts with J 6= J , which the
agent possibly rejects upon acquiring information. For if, given some posterior
belief j, the agent rejects a given incentive-compatible contract C˜S, he would
accept a contract ĈS which only differs from C˜S in that Ĵ = J˜ ∪ {j} and
(t̂jk, q̂jk)k∈I = (0, 0). By “revealed preferences”, ĈS is incentive-compatible, too,
and consequently yields both parties the same payoffs as C˜S. Henceforth, I
therefore assume J = J and denote separating contracts by
CS , ((tlk, qlk)k∈I)l∈J .
Observe that the “revealed preferences” argument would not apply if the
agent had to report the posterior belief after he learns his type, rather than
already before: Once the agent knows the true disutility of production, the
posterior belief is irrelevant to him. Thus, a contract which the agent would
accept regardless of the posterior belief and which does not require any report
before the agent learns his type could not induce information gathering. Crémer
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and Khalil (1992) assume that communication is impossible before the agent
freely learns his type. Consequently, they do not require J = J .
In detail, a separating contract should thus satisfy the following conditions.
First, the agent must submit a truthful report about his type, provided he re-
ported the posterior belief honestly before. The proviso can in fact be dropped:
As argued above, the posterior belief is irrelevant to the agent once he knows
his type. Hence, if he announces the type truthfully after an honest report
about the posterior belief, he will also announce it truthfully after a dishonest
report. Using for the agent’s payoff from a separating contract the notation
Uji , tji − βiqji,
the constraint reads:
Uji ≥ Ujk + (βk − βi)qjk ∀i, k ∈ I; j ∈ J. (S1)
Second, the agent must submit an honest report about the posterior belief,
provided he will later on announce the type truthfully. Since he does not yet
know his type when the report about the posterior belief is due, this constraint
only requires that honesty is more profitable to him in expectation, rather than
for each particular type:
n∑
i=1
γjiUji ≥
n∑
i=1
γjiUli ∀j, l ∈ J. (S2)
Third, the agent should be willing to join the contract. Since, as with pooling
contracts, the agent also does not yet know his type when the participation
decision is due, this constraint only requires that the contract guarantees him a
non-negative payoff in expectation, rather than for each particular type. In con-
trast to pooling contracts, however, the expectation derives from the posterior
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beliefs, because the agent is supposed to gather information:
n∑
i=1
γjiUij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (S3)
Finally, the agent must indeed acquire information. As indicated above, pre-
contractual information can be valuable to him for two reasons if being offered
a separating contract. On the one hand, it allows to take the participation
decision contingent on the posterior belief. On the other hand, given that the
report about the posterior belief is already due before the agent learns the true
disutility of production, precontractual information allows to identify the report
which yields the largest expected payoff. Now, by (S3), the first motive does
not apply. The agent’s valuation for precontractual information is consequently
larger than the level of investigation costs if and only if
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUji − e ≥ max
{
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUli, 0
}
∀l ∈ J. (S4)
Consider now the principal’s objective. By definition, her expected payoff
from a separating contract that satisfies the conditions listed above is
∆S ,
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γji[V (qji)− tji].
Thus, the best separating contracts are the solutions to
PS : max
CS
∆S s.t. (S1)–(S4).
Separating contracts involve a sequential screening mechanism: the agent
must report the posterior belief before he learns his type. Incentive constraints
for dynamic screening mechanisms generally lack useful characterizations (e.g.,
Pavan et al. 2013). Therefore, I will not derive the optimal contract but show
directly that separating contracts might improve over the pooling ones. Let
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W P (e) and W S(e) denote the principal’s expected payoff from the best pooling
and separating contracts, respectively, depending on the level of investigation
costs. For a given cost level e, optimal contracts are separating contracts if
W S(e) > W P (e) and pooling contracts if W S(e) < W P (e). Claim A4 in the
appendix confirms that the functions W P and W S are indeed defined. Lemma
2 provides a partial comparison.
Lemma 2. The functions W P and W S have the following properties:
1. They are non-decreasing and non-increasing, respectively.
2. They are continuous.
3. They have a unique intersection.
Proof. See Claims A5–A8 in the appendix.
The first and the last statement of the lemma are intuitive. With high
investigation costs, the principal does not need to make a trade-off between
efficiency and surplus extraction if she offers a pooling contract. Hence, sepa-
rating contracts are clearly inferior. With low investigation costs, on the other
hand, any disadvantage of separating contracts must be negligible. In particu-
lar, with zero costs, the agent virtually has precontractual information anyway,
so that at least in that case, offering a separating contract cannot generally be
suboptimal.
Lemma 3 completes the comparison.
Lemma 3. It holds that W S(0) > W P (0).
Proof. See Claim A9 in the appendix.
The lemma derives from the observation that the posterior belief determines
the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between rent and participation fee with
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pooling contracts. The basic idea is well-known in the sequential screening lit-
erature and features, in similar form, for instance in the analysis by Battaglini
(2005). To illustrate it, suppose there are just two possible posterior beliefs
and types. Moreover, assume zero investigation costs, so that the agent vir-
tually has precontractual information anyway. If the principal offers a pooling
contract, the trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction then results in
an inefficiently low output level q2 < q∗2 for the agent with the high disutility
of production. The key insight is that the terms of trade should never be dis-
torted for both posterior beliefs in this fashion: With the optimistic posterior
belief, the agent has a larger valuation for additional rent, because he is more
confident to earn it. Hence, if—with the optimistic posterior belief—the agent
was to produce efficiently and pay an extra participation fee that fully extracts
the extra surplus, whereas—with the pessimistic posterior belief—he was to
stick with the original contract, the agent would comply. This scheme amounts
to a separating contract that outperforms all pooling ones. The proof extends
the reasoning to the original model, where the numbers of posterior beliefs and
types are arbitrary, and shows that to each pooling contract there corresponds
a separating one which exhibits “no distortion at the top” and provides the
agent with the same expected payoff.
Combined, Lemmas 2 and 3 yield the main result.
Proposition 1. There exists a cutoff level of investigation costs ê > 0 such
that optimal contracts are separating contracts if e < ê and pooling contracts if
e > ê.
Intuitively, the benefit of separating contracts results from a relaxed
incentive-compatibility condition. With both pooling and separating contracts,
truthful reporting must yield the agent at least the same payoff as the best
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possible deviation strategy. This condition is relaxed with separating contracts
because they oblige the agent to report a piece of private information before he
fully learns the disutility of production. Thus, screening involves choice under
uncertainty for the agent, and he might ultimately not be able to secure those
terms of trade in the contract that he likes best given his true preferences. This
feature vanishes if precontractual investigation removes all uncertainty.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a new perspective on contract design with endogenous
information. It can be optimal to induce a precontractual investigation even
though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing
of the contract. Previous studies reached a different conclusion because they
focused on perfect investigations, so that the benefits of sequential screening
vanished.
The result might have an implication for contracting problems in which
the principal can disclose, without observing, a source of private information
to the agent and the agent can explore some other, less informative source,
which the principal does not control. A good example for such a contracting
problem is again the procurement-of-customized-goods example mentioned in
the introduction. Here, it seems plausible that the project owner can to some
extent influence when, and in which form, the contractor inspects the designs of
the good. The recent literature on disclosure rules in optimal auctions has not
studied the case in which agents can conduct precontractual investigations, but
the analyses suggests that the principal should disclose her source of private
information only after the signing of the contract, so as to be able to charge
participation fees (e.g., Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007; Esö and Szentes
18
2007; Gershkov 2009). The information structure would then be identical to
the one in the present paper. Thus, the principal possibly induces the agent to
conduct a precontractual investigation even though she herself can costlessly
disclose precontractual information.
Appendix
Claim A1. (P1) is satisfied if and only if it holds that
Ui − Ui+1 ∈ [(βi+1 − βi) qi+1, (βi+1 − βi) qi] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (A.1)
qi − qi+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (1)
Proof. The proof is standard, and therefore omitted.
Claim A2. If CP satisfies (P1) and (P2), condition (P3) holds as well if and
only if
m∑
j=l
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi + e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (A.2)
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results.
(I) First, straightforward algebra shows that (P3) is equivalent to
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γjiUi
}
+ e ≥ 0.
Second, according to Claim A1, (P1) implies Ui ≥ Ui+1 for all types
i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and hence, by the first-order stochastic dominance
ranking of the posterior probability distributions,
n∑
i=1
γjiUi ≥
n∑
i=1
γ(j+1)iUi ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. (A.3)
Third, given (A.3) a necessary condition for (P2) is
∑n
i=1 γ1iUi ≥ 0.
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The claim can now be proved. Suppose CP satisfies (P1) and (P2) but
violates (P3). By (I), there is a posterior belief l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γjiUi
}
+ e =
m∑
j=l
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi + e < 0;
hence, (A.2) does not hold. Suppose CP satisfies (P1) and (P2) but vio-
lates (A.2). Let l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} be the smallest posterior belief j such that∑n
i=1 γjiUi < 0. By (I),
0 >
m∑
j=l
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi + e =
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γjiUi
}
+ e,
that is, (P3) does not hold.
Claim A3. Suppose CP satisfies (A.1), (1), (P2), and (A.2). Then, there is
a pooling contract which satisfies (1), (P2), (A.2),
Ui − Ui+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (∗)
and results in identical expected payoffs for both parties.
Proof. Suppose there exists a type k ∈ I for which the original contract CP
implies
Uk − Uk+1 = (βk+1 − βk) qk+1 + x,
where x is such that (A.1) holds. The alternative contract, denoted by C˜P ,
differs from CP only with respect to transfers. Specifically,
t˜i =
ti −
(
1−∑mj=1 pijΓjk)x if i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
ti +
∑m
j=1 pijΓjkx if i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}.
This difference implies
U˜k − U˜k+1 = (βk+1 − βk) qk+1
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and
U˜i − U˜i+1 = Ui − Ui+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} \ k.
Furthermore,
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjit˜i =
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiti,
so that the alternative contract satisfies (P2) and results in identical expected
payoffs for both parties as the original one. Finally, since it holds for any
posterior belief l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} that
m∑
j=l
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiU˜i + e =
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γjiUi − Γjkx+
m∑
j=1
pijΓjkx
]
+ e
≥
m∑
j=l
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiUi + e ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from the first-order stochastic dominance rank-
ing of the posterior probability distributions and the second one from the hy-
pothesis, condition (A.2) is met as well.
Claim A4. There exist solutions to both PP and PS.
Proof. I will use the following definitions and the theorem below by Rockafellar
(1970): A concave function h : RI → R ∪ {−∞} is proper if h(x) > −∞ for
at least one x, and it is closed if {x : h(x) ≥ α} is closed for every α ∈ R. A
vector y 6= 0 is a direction of recession of a convex set D if x+λy ∈ D for every
λ ≥ 0 and every x ∈ D. The directions of recession of a closed proper concave
function h are the directions of recession of the sets {x : h(x) ≥ α}, α ∈ R.
(II) (Rockafellar 1970, Thm. 27.3) Let h : RI → R∪ {−∞} be a closed proper
concave function, and let D ⊆ RI be a non-empty closed convex set over
which h is to be maximized. If h and D have no direction of recession in
common, then h attains its supremum over D.
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Consider first program PP . The objective function can be restated as fol-
lows:
h(CP ) =

∑m
j=1 pij
∑n
i=1 γji[V (qi)− ti] if qi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
−∞ else.
Due to the assumptions on V , h is a closed proper concave function. Let D be
the set of all pooling contracts that satisfy (P1)–(P3). Those constraints can
be described by closed level sets of affine functions, so that D must be closed
and convex. D is furthermore non-empty; for instance, the pooling contract
CP with (ti, qi) = (0, 0) for all types i ∈ I satisfies (P1)–(P3).
I now apply (II) and show that the function h and the set D do not have
directions of recession in common. As V ′(∞) = 0, and because h(CP ) = −∞
if CP contains some strictly negative qi, any direction of recession of h must
satisfy
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γjiti ≤ 0 and qi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
But even the set of all pooling contracts that satisfy (P1) and (P2) cannot have
such directions of recession.
Consider now program PS. The set of all separating contracts that satisfy
(S1)–(S4) is non-empty; for instance, any separating contract CS with
(tji, qji) =
(0, 0)∀i ∈ I if j 6= 1(t, q)∀i ∈ I if j = 1,
where (t, q) fulfills
pi1
[
t−
n∑
i=1
γ1iβiq
]
− e ≥ 0 and t−
n∑
i=1
γ2iβiq ≤ 0,
satisfies (S1)–(S4). Such separating contracts exist due to the first-order
stochastic dominance ranking of the posterior probability distributions. Ex-
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istence of solutions to program PS can now be proved analogously to program
PP .
Claim A5. The functions W P and W S are non-decreasing and non-increasing,
respectively.
Proof. If e increases, the feasible sets in PP and PS expand and contract,
respectively. The corresponding objective functions, on the other hand, do not
vary with e.
Claim A6. There exists a cutoff level of investigation costs e′ > 0 such that,
for any e < e′,
W P (e) = max
(qi)ni=1
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γji[V (qi)− βiqi]
−
[
− e
pim
+
m−1∑
j=1
pij
n−1∑
i=1
(Γji − Γmi)(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
s.t. (1).
Proof. The proof adapts an insight by Crémer and Khalil (1992).
(III) There exists a value q > 0 such that, for any e, solutions to P̂P satisfy
qi ≥ q for all i ∈ I.
Proof. In effect, this is Claim 1 of the appendix by Crémer and Khalil
(1992). Their proof applies to the current setting.
The claim can now be proved. By (III) and the first-order stochastic domi-
nance ranking of the posterior probability distributions, solutions to P̂P satisfy
n−1∑
i=1
Γji(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 >
n−1∑
i=1
Γ(j+1)i(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
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Since Un enters the objective function with negative sign, there must hence
exist a cutoff level of investigation costs e′ > 0 such that, for any e < e′, the
principal chooses Un to satisfy
pim
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γmi(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
+ e = 0
and (2) holds with strict inequality. Inserting this value of Un into the objective
function establishes the claim.
Claim A7. The functions W P and W S are continuous.
Proof. Since the objective functions and the constraints of PP and PS are
concave in both the parameter e and the choice variables, W P and W S must
be concave (e.g., de la Fuente 2000, p. 313, Thm. 2.12). Hence, W P and W S
are continuous on (0,∞). Claim A6 implies that W P must be continuous at
e = 0. Suppose W S is not continuous at e = 0. By concavity, lime↓0W S(e)
exists and lime↓0W S(e) > W S(0). This inequality contradicts Claim A5.
Claim A8. The functions W P and W S have a unique intersection.
Proof. The following expression will be helpful:
W ∗ ,
m∑
j=1
pij
n∑
i=1
γji[V (q
∗
i )− βiq∗i ].
Note that W P (e) ≤ W ∗ and W S(e) ≤ W ∗ − e for all e.
I first argue that intersections exist. At e = 0, to any pooling contract CP
which satisfies (P1)–(P3) there corresponds a separating contract CS which
satisfies (S1)–(S4) such that (tji, qji)i∈I = (ti, qi)i∈I for all j ∈ J . Thus,
W S(0) ≥ W P (0). Suppose W S(0) > W P (0), and define e˜ = W ∗ − W P (0).
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As W P is increasing by Claim A5, it holds that W S(e˜) ≤ W P (e˜). Since W S
and W P are continuous by Claim A7, the intermediate value theorem implies
that intersections exist.
I now argue that there cannot be several intersections. Any intersection
must lie in the interval [0, e∗), e∗ > 0 being the cutoff level of investigation
costs such that condition (3) binds in program P̂P if and only if e < e∗. That
is, W P (e) < W ∗ if e < e∗ and W P (e) = W ∗ if e ≥ e∗. Recall from the proof of
Claim A7 that W P is concave, and therefore differentiable almost everywhere.
At points where it is differentiable, it holds that
dW P (e)
de
=
m−1∑
j=1
κj,
where the κ′s are non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated to condition (3).
By definition, at each e ∈ [0, e∗) there is at least one strictly positive multiplier.
As the function W P is continuous by Claim A7, it must hence be strictly
increasing on [0, e∗). This implies that there cannot be several intersections,
since the function W S is non-increasing by Claim A5.
Claim A9. It holds that W S(0) > W P (0).
Proof. I first establish two auxiliary results.
(IV) Suppose e = 0. Let CP be one of the best pooling contracts that satisfy (∗)
and (1)–(3). Then, it holds that qi < q∗i for all types i > 1 and q1 = q∗1.
Proof. By Claim A6,
qn ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγjn [V (q)− βnq]−
m−1∑
j=1
pij
(
Γj(n−1) − Γm(n−1)
)
(βn − βn−1)q
+ λn−1(qn−1 − q),
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qi ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγji [V (q)− βiq]−
m−1∑
j=1
pij
(
Γj(i−1) − Γm(i−1)
)
(βi − βi−1)q
+ λi(q − qi+1) + λi−1(qi−1 − q) ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
and
q1 ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγ1i [V (q)− β1q] + λ1(q − q2),
where the λs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated to con-
straint (1). It follows that q1 = q∗1 and qn < q∗n. Consider any type
i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, and suppose qi+1 < q∗i+1. If λi = 0, it holds that
qi < q
∗
i . If λi > 0, on the other hand, complementary slackness implies
qi = qi+1, so that qi < q∗i by the induction hypothesis.
(V) Suppose e = 0. Let CP be a pooling contract that satisfies (∗) and (1)–
(3), and let CP be a pooling contract that satisfies (∗) and (1). Moreover,
suppose q
i
≥ qi for all i ∈ I and
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γ1i (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 = Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γ1i (βi+1 − βi) qi+1. (A.4)
Then, the separating contract C˜S, defined as follows, satisfies (S1)–(S4):
(t˜1i, q˜1i)i∈I = (ti, qi)i∈I and (t˜ji, q˜ji)i∈I = (ti, qi)i∈I ∀j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Since both CP and CP satisfy (∗) and (1), the separating contract
C˜S satisfies (S1) by Claim A1. I next verify that (S2) is met as well. By
(A.4), the agent has no incentive to misrepresent the most optimistic pos-
terior belief, j = 1. With all other posterior beliefs, the agent’s expected
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gain from deviating is non-positive as well:
n∑
i=1
γij[ti − βiqi]−
n∑
i=1
γij[ti − βiqi]
= Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 − Un −
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
=
n∑
i=1
(Γij − Γi1) (βi+1 − βi) (qi+1 − qi+1) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the first-order stochastic dominance
ranking of the posterior probability distributions. Condition (S3) holds
since CP satisfies (3) and since the agent has an incentive to report the
posterior belief truthfully. Finally, given that investigation costs are zero,
(S2) implies (S4).
The claim can now be proved. Let CP be one of the best pooling contracts
that satisfy (∗) and (1)–(3). Consider the pooling contract CP , defined as
follows:
(q
i
)ni=1 = (q
∗
i )
n
i=1,
(ti)
n−1
i=1 s.t. U i − U i+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
tn s.t. Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 = Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1.
By (IV), q
i
≥ qi for all i ∈ I. Therefore, (V) ensures that the separating
contract C˜S, defined as follows, satisfies (S1)–(S4):
(ti1, qi1)i∈I = (ti, qi)i∈I and (tij, qij)i∈I = (ti, qi)i∈I ∀j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
By (IV), C˜S generates strictly more expected surplus than the best pooling
contract CP . By construction, both contracts provide the agent with the same
expected payoff. These two observations establish the claim.
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